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Abstract: Resource-rich dictatorships are more inclined to repress civil society than others. In this paper, 
we identify a tradeoff between political rents from natural resources and the organizational density of 
civil society. This organizational density determines the extent to which citizens can threaten the 
dictator with a revolution. We find that, in the occurrence of a negative oil price shock, regime change 
becomes likely, whereas a positive oil shock increases the extractive capacity of the dictator. When a 
negative oil price shock occurs, the persecution of failed revolutionaries can prevent revolution if the 
probability of revolutionary success is already low ex-ante. Historical and contemporary illustrations are 
drawn from Iran, the Soviet Union/Russia and Egypt.  
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In 2012, the Russian parliament passed an amendment to a law from 2006 that became known as the 
foreign agent law. According to this amendment, non-governmental organizations (NGOs) that receive 
foreign funding and operate in political issues have to register as “foreign agents”, which entails 
financial audits every three months. The process of subordinating civil society to the state started on the 
grounds of transparency, but has been directed more toward “licensing civil society” (Robertson, 2009: 
540). In this paper, we argue that resource-abundant dictatorships are more inclined to control civil 
society than resource-poor dictatorships due to their vulnerability to energy price shocks. Given that 
civil society bridges the gap between the citizenry and the state, formal as well as informal associations 
constitute forms of civic organization (Richter, 2002: 30). The capacity of civil society to constrain 
governments explains why the external financial support of “foreign agents” is adverse for autocratic 
regimes. Moreover, refusal of external funding may seem contradictory taking into account that a 
plethora of these states have a high abundance of natural resources and generate rents from exporting 
oil and other minerals. These countries are highly dependent on the international prices of their natural 
resources, which is oil in most cases. In this regard, Ross (2012: 51) has ascertained that the price of oil 
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has fluctuated annually by an average of 26.5% since 1970. Isham, Woolcock, Pritchett & Busby (2005: 
143) differentiate between point resources (including oils, minerals and plantation crops) that are 
geographically concentrated and diffuse resources that are not. The former are connected with poor 
institutional quality (Isham et al. 2005: 143), which is based on the fact that point resources are easier to 
control and go hand-in-hand with vertical power relationships, and hence with a concentration of rents 
to a small elite (Bulte, Damania & Deacon 2005, 1031). 
Acemoglu & Robinson (2006) (further: A&R 2006) take a certain stage of development of civil 
society as given; they do not examine the mechanism between civil society and regime stability. Desai, 
Olofsgård & Yousef (2009) develop a theoretical model of authoritarian bargain in which rents are used 
to buy off citizens and test it on 80 non-democracies over a period of 25 years. Their model rests on the 
hypothesis that repression is insufficient for a dictatorship to survive because the citizens might only 
pretend to be supportive but secretly plan a rebellion (Desai, Olofsgård & Yousef 2009: 93). The 
theoretical model thus shows how the interplay of available rents to the dictator, transfers to the 
citizens and a policy over which dictator and citizens do not agree (political freeness) act as balancing 
mechanisms helping the dictator survive. They confirm empirically that the availability of rents – for 
example, through windfalls from oil revenues – are supportive from the standpoint of negotiating and 
thus of the assertive force and survival of the dictator (ibid.: 106-125). Furthermore, Haber and Menaldo 
(2011) observe that there is no causal inference to be drawn on the positive effect of natural resources on 
dictatorship.  
By examining a panel of U.S. states from 1970-2001, Boyce & Emery (2011: 7-11) observe lower 
growth rates in per capita income but higher levels of per capita income; they point out that 
institutional failure is the cause behind the negative relationship of natural resources and growth found 
thus far. Robinson, Torvik & Verdier (2006) show in their two-period probabilistic voting model that 
politicians inefficiently over-extract natural resources but also that resource booms lead to increased 
public sector employment and simultaneously decreased private sector employment; the institutional 
features of an economy determine whether the total income will increase or decrease (Robinson, Torvik 
& Verdier 2006: 456-462). This is in line with Ross (2001) who demonstrates that resource abundance of 
oil has a negative impact on the democratization process of a country. Furthermore, Cuaresma, 
Oberhofer & Raschky (2011) find, using a dataset of 106 dictators and controlling for different 
definitions of dictatorship, that higher levels of oil production strengthen the political power of 
dictators such that they can extend their authoritarian survival. Even when testing the robustness of 
their results by including institutional variables, i.e. by checking if the institutional quality of the state is 
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the only variable with an effect on the duration of dictatorships, they continue to find that oil 
significantly influences the duration of dictatorships.  
Ghandi & Przeworski (2006: 6-9) distinguish between a cooperation, a cooptation and a turmoil 
equilibrium which mainly depend on the net severity of punishment of the opposition and the 
probability that the opposition overthrows the dictator, i.e. the strength of the opposition and the policy 
concession that the dictator makes. The essential element in their investigation is thus the need of the 
dictator to cooperate with the opposition (ibid.: 19). In a similar vein, Acemoglu, Robinson & Verdier 
(2004) propose a model of a kleptocratic ruler who expropriates the citizens’ wealth but remains in 
power due to his divide-and-rule policy tactic. To overthrow the dictator, the citizens would need to 
cooperate but the kleptocrat is able to attract part of the populace to his side by using tax revenues and 
natural resource rents as a bribe (ibid.). Concentrating even more on natural resources, Egorov, Guriev 
& Sonin (2009) explore why resource poor dictators allow freer media. Free media are needed to 
monitor bureaucrats, but at the same time they indicate the strength and ability of a dictator to prevent 
a revolution (ibid.: 647); they refer to the Soviet Union under Gorbachev, who seemed forced to 
introduce glasnost under declining oil prices and a major budget deficit.  
Shifting the focus on civil society, Putnam, Leonardi & Nanetti (1994: 83) see the involvement of 
civil society and closeness of the civil community as reasons why some regions have better functioning 
institutions than others. They identify features that are important for democratic development, such as 
political equality, cooperation and solidarity, trust and tolerance. As they point out, trust helps citizens 
to overcome defection from collective action. Ostrom (2009: 188) proposes a number of parameters that 
shape the emergence of collective action: the number of participants in the group, whether the potential 
gain is a public good or a common-pool resource, the heterogeneity of the group in regard to the 
individuals, the possibility of direct communication, what the production function looks like and 
whether the collective action occurs in a repetitive manner. Tilly (1978: 100) states that the relevant 
action space of collective action ranges from facilitation to repression and along these lines the group is 
able to promote or impede collective action. Accordingly, organizational density reflects facilitation 
mechanisms (Kim & Bearman, 1997: 75) that can make civil society develop more or less smoothly. This 
definition constitutes a measure of cooperation as described in Ghandi and Przeworski (2006: 5). More 
than that, it captures the notion of trust as a crucial element, as outlined in Putnam, Leonardi and 
Nanetti (1993: 89).  
Organizational density stands close to social capital, which is described as the key element of 
civil society (Fukuyama 2001: 7). Social capital can reduce the costs of transactions that occur in 
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economies as a result of the problem of coordinating the mechanisms of the economy (ibid.: 10). Paxton 
(2002: 256) emphasizes that social capital is embedded in the interactions of the citizens. Moreover, it is 
often a by-product of social and historical interactions and roots such as religion (Fukuyama, 2001: 16-
17). Bernhard (1993: 309) points out that civil society is separated from the state and needs to be 
sanctioned by it. In this sense, civil society is thought of as a bounded space which the dictator can limit 
or expand but not intervene in. Fukuyama (2001: 18) indicates that not only can the government 
promote the development of social capital by investing in education, but it can also prevent its growth. 
If the state does not ensure the supply of public goods essential for cooperation among citizens, such as 
property rights protection and public safety, social capital cannot evolve, which may also explain 
authoritarian stability.  
Bernhard and Karakoç (2007: 540) analyze the participation in organizational life and protests 
that they associate with the emergence of civil society in 42 countries that used to be dictatorships 
before becoming democracies. One of their main findings is that the duration of the antecedent regime 
critically influences the rise of a post-transition, democratic civil society (ibid.: 556). Diamond (1994: 7-
11) refers to the democratic functions and dynamics of civil society: the limitation of state power, i.e. to 
monitor and democratize authoritarian states; the stimulation of political participation; the 
strengthening of democratic features such as tolerance, articulation and representation of interests; the 
mitigation of political conflict by allowing pluralistic views; and the training of new political leaders 
and the spread of information (Diamond 1994: 7-11). Fox (1996) investigates the development paths and 
opportunities of civil society organizations in authoritarian rural Mexico and identifies the existence of 
long-run horizontal cooperation and reciprocity. 
In our theoretical model, we propose that dictators prefer a restrained civil society and high 
rents from natural resources; civil society can empower citizens against the dictator, whereas rents from 
natural resources strengthen the de facto power of the dictator and therefore increase the cost of 
revolution for citizens. Our paper defines the critical threshold of cooperation and trust at the level of 
civil society, where active resistance against an authoritarian government starts taking place. This is 
captured by what we call the organizational density of civil society. Evidence from Iran, the Soviet 
Union/Russia and Egypt confirms that, in the presence of a negative oil price shock, oil dependence 
and a dense civil society can lead to revolution, whereas, in the presence of a positive oil price shock, 
persecution by the dictator is likely to occur.   
This paper is organized as follows. The civil society protest and persecution games are 
introduced and solved in section II, both in static and dynamic forms. Section III discusses historical 
5 
and contemporary evidence on the role of civil society in regime change from Iran, Egypt and the Soviet 
Union/Russia. Section IV concludes.  
 
II. The Model 
 
We propose a game-theoretical framework on the interaction between the organizational density of civil 
society and the availability of resource rents for the dictator based on A&R (2006, particularly chapter 5) 
and Desai, Olofsgård & Yousef (2009).  There are two players, the dictator d and the citizen c. The 
number of citizens is normalized to one and it is assumed that all citizens have the same income and 
policy preferences. There is perfect information. As in Egorov, Guriev and Sonin (2009: 652), the 
economy consists of a natural resource sector, which is the main income source of the dictator, and a 
“modern” sector, which integrates the citizens into the economic sphere and in which they generate 
their income. 
The natural resource sector is set up in the following way: the country under consideration is 
endowed with a natural resource nationalized by the dictator. This natural resource is considered to be 
oil, but may also be any other natural resource. The oil market is exogenous and therefore the dictator 
cannot actively intervene, for example, by reducing the oil production. Furthermore, the extraction of 
oil is costless and the dictator always extracts the same amount of oil denoted by q, which is normalized 
to one. The price of oil is the state variable, which is exposed to fluctuations in the international oil 
market. In a non-shock situation, the price of oil is normalized to one, so that 1p = . In the case of a 
shock, nature decides on the price jp , which can be either high h (positive shock) or low l (negative 
shock), such that { },j l hp p p∈ and 1l hp p p< = < . The probability of a high price is Pr( )hp p π= = , such 
that ( )0,1π ∈ . It follows that Pr( ) 1lp p π= = − . The oil price determines how many rents the dictator can 
receive from oil extraction.  
In contrast to the oil sector, the modern sector includes everything requiring human capital and 
citizen interaction, such as the communications sector. Contrary to Egorov, Guriev and Sonin (2009: 
652), the modern sector is not dependent on the provision of a public good but rather on the 
organizational densityα of the civil society. It is assumed that 0 1α< < . In the modern sector, prices and 
quantities are normalized to one; both sectors are of equal size in a non-shock situation. The dictator can 
impose an income tax in the modern sector, which can be either high or low, such that { },i l hτ τ τ∈ , 
0 1jτ≤ ≤ . This is an extractive tax used only as a rent instrument for the dictator rather than for 
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redistribution. Citizens can threaten the power of the dictator, which is described as the possibility of a 
revolution. They either start a revolution, R, or restrain from it, N (non-revolution). A&R (2006: 120) call 
this the revolution constraint. 




( )jU ⋅   Utility of player j in static game (= payoff) 
( )jV ⋅   Utility of player j in dynamic game 
{ },j l hp p p∈  Price of oil; being either in a high or low state (shock) or one (non-shock) 1l hp p p< = <  
π   Probability of hp ; ( )0,1π ∈ ; Pr( )hp p π= = ; Pr( ) 1lp p π= = −  
α  Organizational density of civil society, 0 1α< <  
{ },i l hτ τ τ∈  Extractive tax, 0 1jτ≤ ≤   
R Revolution, decision variable of the citizens 
N Non-revolution, counterstrategy to R 
S 
Persecution variable, strategy of the dictator to either persecute citizens after failed 
revolution (S) or not (NS) 
σ  Probability of winning a revolution for the citizens 
c(S) Cost of persecution 
We use the Markov perfect equilibria (MPE) definition of Maskin and Tirole (2001) for the dynamic 
games of our paper. The behavior of the players at a certain point of the game depends only on the state 
of the game and not on the entire history of the game. By using MPEs, we avoid the occurrence of 
possible commitment problems (Acemoglu and Robinson, 2006: 153). The strategies of the players are 
formalized as dσ  and cσ . The strategy of the dictator is to select the tax rate jτ conditional on α  and 
jp , i.e. { }( , )d j jpσ τ α= . The strategy of citizens is to opt for or against revolution, which is denoted 
by ρ , where 1ρ =  indicates a revolution and 0ρ =  indicates non-revolution. The decision for or against 
revolution depends on the events that occur beforehand, i.e. on jp  and jτ . Therefore, the strategy of 
citizens is also a function, such that [ ] { }( , ) : 0,1 0,1c j jpσ ρ τ= → . The strategies dσ and cσ are defined as 
sub-game perfect equilibrium strategies, which are best responses of the players in all sub-games. 
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The Civil Society Protest Game 
The timing of the civil society protest game is the following (figure 1): 
1. Nature decides on the oil price shock, with a probability π of having a high price hp . 
2. The dictator decides on tax jτ  such that { }, .j l hτ τ τ∈  
3. The citizens decide between revolution R and non-revolution N. 
 
Figure 1: the civil society protest game 
In this static version, the game is non-repetitive, i.e. played only once; ending – as indicated – in 
revolution or non-revolution. This will change in the Markovian (dynamic) version later on. 
In the case of a non-revolution, the payoff for the dictator consists of the taxes he collects and the rents 
he receives from oil such that: 
 
1( , , )
1





The payoff of citizens is simply their after-tax income: 
 1( , ) (1 )
1





In the case of a revolution, citizens always win and overthrow the dictator. The dictator receives 
nothing, which is independent of all other variables such that: 
 ( ) 0dU R =   






without paying the extractive tax but have to bear the cost of 
revolution 1( )R j jc p p q
α
= ; hence, they fully appropriate the modern sector such that: 
 1 1( , )
1
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The cost of revolution can be thought of as the cost of fighting against the dictator. The costs increase 
with the price of oil because, in this case, the dictator has more de facto power or monetary power to 
subdue a revolution. Furthermore, more organizational density is associated with better, and more, 
revolution planning capacity. The partial derivatives of the cost function with respect to jp  andα  are 
indicative: 
 









( ) 1 0
R j






Moreover, the citizens prefer low taxes: 
 










The dictator prefers to have high taxes and high prices for oil, which can be seen in the derivative with 
respect to jτ  and jp : 
 





















The revolution constraint in the static game is defined as follows:  
( ) ( ) ( )1 1 1, 1 1 1 1 1(,1 1 1 )1 1
c j j j c j j j j jU N p q pU p pRτ τ
α
ατ τ
α α αα α α
−









≤ . The dictator sets the tax lτ in non-shock situations, which is the highest possible tax level 
at which the citizens do not revolt, such that 1l pατ
α
−
= . It follows that the threshold value *α  for 

















, which is the combination of all the variables external to the 
organizational density that exert pressure on it and reveals the levels and combinations of jp  and jτ  at 
which the strategy of the citizens is 1ρ =  (revolution). 
Proposition 1 
 The static civil society protest game has the following unique sub-game perfect equilibrium, such that: 
1) In the case of a negative oil shock ( lp ), the revolution constraint is binding regardless of which tax 
( lτ or hτ ) the dictator sets. 
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2) In the case of a positive oil shock ( hp ):  
a) if *α α> , the dictator sets lτ  and remains in power.  
b) if *α α≤ , the dictator sets hτ  and remains in power.  
Proof:  See the appendix 





 the citizens are more likely to start a revolution, 
meaning that for lower values of jp , i.e. lp , and higher values of jτ , i.e. lτ , a revolution is more likely. 
Comparative Statics 
A high organizational density and a negative price shock reduce the probability of the dictator setting a 


















The best-case scenario for the dictator is when jp  is in a high state, hp , and α  is low, whereby the costs 
of a revolution are rising. In this case, the probability is high that the dictator will set a tax that will not 
lead to revolution. If the dictator sets the tax hτ and there is still no revolution, a critical α  can be 
derived. If α α< , there will never be a revolution. The worst-case scenario for the dictator is when the 
cost of revolution is low, which suggests that j lp p= , and α  is so high that the citizens have high 
organizational density.  
Corollary 1 




















Proof:  See the appendix 
Moreover, the significance of the oil sector may change as compared to the modern sector. The dictator 









. Revolution becomes increasingly costlier for the citizen 
as q increases.  
Markovian Equilibria 
As per A&R (2006, 152), in an infinite horizon the utilities of players are now defined over their 
discounted sums of incomes at time 0t =  such that 
0
 for ,i t io
t
U E y i c dβ
∞
=
= =∑ . We assume that the 
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stage is now repeated. This way, the players account for their possible future gains or losses in their 
current utilities and adjust their strategies accordingly.  
The timing of the civil society protest game is therefore as follows: 
1) Nature decides jtp , with a probability π of having a high price
h
tp ; 
2) The dictator selects the tax jtτ , being either 
h
tτ  or 
l
tτ ; 
3) Citizens decide between revolution R and non-revolution N. If they select R, they have to bear 
the cost of revolution in period t but enjoy the payoff of democracy in all further periods. If they 
decide for N, the game is repeated.  
We use Bellman optimization and the MPE concept. The payoff from democracy for citizens is the 
income they generate in the modern sector. We assume that the oil sector is destroyed in the revolution 
and an investment by the democratic government is necessary to rebuild it. The citizens and the 
dictator therefore have the following respective payoffs from democracy: 













Furthermore, the citizen payoff from revolution is the following: 
1 1 1 1 1( , ) ( ) ( , )
1 1 1
1 1( , )
(1 )(1 )
c j j c c j j
c j j
V R p p q V D V R p p q
V R p p q
β β
α α α α α
α β α
  = − + ⇒ = − + ⇒   − − − 
= −
− −
   
As stated above, the oil sector is missing in this equation due to a lack of investment for rebuilding. The 
payoffs for the dictator and the citizen from non-revolution have the following form: 
1 1 1( , ) ( , ) ( , )
1 1 1
1 1( , ) (1 ) ( ) ( , ) (1 )
1 (1 )(1 )
d j j j d j d j j j
c j j c c j j
V N p p q V N p V N p p q
V N V N V N
τ β τ
α β α
τ τ β τ τ
α β α
  = + + ⇒ = +   − − − 
 = − + ⇒ = − − − −
   
The revolution constraint is therefore binding if and only if: 
1 1 1 (1 )(1 )( , ) (1 ) ( , )
(1 )(1 ) (1 )(1 )
c j j j c j j jV N p q V R p pα βτ τ τ
β α α β α α
− −
= − < − = ⇒ >
− − − −
   
Revolution can be averted if (1 )(1 )j jpα βτ
α
− −
≤ , and so the dictator sets the highest possible tax. A 










 is derived. This is the actual value of the organizational density of the 
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, which is the combination of the variables that exert external pressure on the 
organizational density.  
Proposition 2 
In the civil society protest game there exists a Markov-perfect equilibrium, such that: 
1) In the case of a negative oil shock ( lp ), the revolution constraint is binding such that there is a revolution 
regardless of which tax ( lτ or hτ ) the dictator sets. 
2) In the case of a positive oil shock ( hp ): 
a) if **α α> , the dictator sets lτ and remains in power.  
b) if **α α≤ , the dictator sets hτ and remains in power.  
Proof:  See the appendix 
Proposition 2 and the reasoning behind it are in the same direction as those used by Olson (1993). Olson 
(1993, 568) distinguishes between roving and stationary bandits who both exploit and repress citizens. 
However, whereas the roving bandits leave few incentives for the citizens to invest in production and 
the economy, the stationary bandits have an interest in a well-functioning economy and give the 
citizens incentives to increase productivity. In this way, a stationary bandit maximizes his wealth. 
Unsurprisingly and in line with this work, the stationary bandits are the dictators (Olson 1993: 569). The 
differentiation of Olson (1993, 568) between roving and stationary bandits can be transferred to non-
consolidated and consolidated dictatorships in this model. The assumption that in discontinuous 
societies (frequent regime changes) the evaluation of the political state of society looks like that in 
proposition 2 is, however, debatable. It is quite conceivable that proposition 1 has to be considered 
again for these regimes. 
Comparative statics 
A high α , a high β and a low jp (i.e. lp ) make it more likely that the dictator is not able to buy off the 
citizens with a low tax to avert revolution. The partial derivatives are the following: 
2
(1 )(1 ) 0




























With an increase in α  or an increase in β  the dictator has to set a lower tax to avert a revolution. 
However, an increase in jp  enables the dictator to set a higher tax without facing a credible threat of 
revolution.  
Corollary 2 


























Proof:  See the appendix 
A negative oil shock will always lead to a revolution because this is a less costly choice for citizens and 
the dictator can make no credible offer to prevent it from happening. Only if there is a positive oil shock 
can the dictator increase his extraction rate over the economy.   
The Civil Society Persecution Game 
It has already been made clear that civil society can be considered to be a threat to the dictator who, in 
turn, intends to restrict this foreign agent. We consider the subgame starting from the low state lp , when 
the de facto power of the dictator is reduced due to low oil revenues. Therefore, the assumption that the 
citizens always win a revolution if they start it is dropped. We introduce the probability ( )0,1σ ∈  of 
winning a revolution for citizens. Moreover, the dictator does not have to select an extractive tax, but to 
decide on the imposition of persecution of citizens who revolt but fail. The strategy of the dictator 
changes to [ ] { }: 0,1 0,1d Sσ = → , where 1S =  indicates persecution (S for sanction) and 0S =  indicates 
non-persecution after a failed revolution.3 The tax is always set at lτ  because, as seen earlier, a higher 
tax rate makes a revolution more likely and this is what the dictator intends to avoid. This timing of 
events is now the following (figure 2): 
1) Nature decides on a negative oil shock, resulting in lp . 
2) The dictator decides whether he will persecute a failed revolution (S=1) or not (S=0). 
3) The citizens decide on revolution R or non-revolution N. 
4) If the citizens decide on R, then they win the revolution with a probability of σ .   
                                                          
3 A&R (2006, 133) observe that the ruling elite promises improvements to the poor citizens; however, this can also 
be treated in negative terms, namely that the ruling elite promises to persecute defiant behavior by citizens. A&R 
(2006, 186) also propose a model of repression, which has functioned as an inspiration for this model. 
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 Figure 2: the civil society persecution game 
In the occurrence of persecution and failed revolution, the respective payoffs for the citizen and the 
dictator are as follows: 
   
where ( )c S  denotes the cost of persecution. This persecution may include total appropriation of the 
citizens’ income by the dictator. If σ  is interpreted as the share of the citizens engaged in revolution 
such that the probability of a successful revolution increases with the number of participating citizens, 
the interpretation of persecution as brutal physical force becomes more realistic. Nevertheless, the 
dictator has to think about declining tax revenues now paid by only a share of 1 σ−  citizens.4 It is also 
assumed that ( 0, ) ( , )c l c lU S U Nτ τ= = , with the result that the citizens keep their after-tax income. All 
other payoffs remain the same. The revolution constraint is set up as follows: 
( , ) ( , ) (1 ) ( 1)c l c l cU N U R p U Sτ σ σ< + − =    
Alternatively, if the dictator does not want to punish the citizens, the revolution constraint changes to 
( , ) ( , ) (1 ) ( 0, )c l c l c lU N U R p U Sτ σ σ τ< + − = . It is obvious that the strategy not to punish the citizens 
results in the same outcome as in the first game (proposition 1). This is due to the assumption that 
                                                          
4 The dictator has to identify the tradeoff between persecution and non-persecution such that: 
( ) (1 ) ( 1) ( ) (1 ) ( 0, )d d d d lU R U S U R U Sσ σ σ σ τ+ − = > + − = . Assuming 1( 1) ( )
1
d lU S c S p q
α
= = − +
−
 and 
1 1( 0, ) ( )
1 1
l
d l l lU S p q c S ττ τ
α α
−
= = + ⇒ <
− −
 indicates that the dictator will persecute citizens-revolutionaries 
when this condition holds. But since refraining from persecution will always lead to revolution in the case of lp  
(which can be seen in the revolution constraint for the citizens), the dictator has no other chance than to persecute 
or to give up. 
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( 0, ) ( , )c l c lU S U Nτ τ= = . Hence, ( , ) ( , ) (1 ) ( , )c l c l c lU N U R p U Nτ σ σ τ< + − , which suggests that the 
revolution constraint is the same as in the initial game, ( , ) ( , )c l c lU N U R pτ < . The more interesting part 
is when the dictator decides to persecute. The revolution constraint can be written as 








α α α σ σ τ
 − < − ⇒ < − − + + − 











***α  can be interpreted as the pressure of all the variables combined that are external to the citizen and 
that challenge the organizational density of the civil society. For simplicity, it is assumed that 1 lσ τ< + . 







 because we assume that the probability of winning a revolution has no influence 




l l l l l
p p p p
p p p p
σ τα α σ
σ τ σ τ τ
−
> ⇒ > ⇒ <
+ + − + −











 holds, citizens will decide on non-revolution, because this σ , in turn, influences 
the size of the combined external pressure ***α   
Proposition 3 
The static civil society persecution game has a unique sub-game perfect equilibrium, such that: 
1) If the dictator decides not to persecute citizens after a failed revolution { }( 0 )d Sσ = = , a revolution occurs.  


























, such that *** *α α≤ ,  the strategy of the citizens is R, such that { }c Rσ =  
Proof:  See the appendix 
 
Comparative Statics 






























If the probability of a successful revolution increases, the dictator has to decrease the tax rate to prevent 
revolution; however, he can increase the tax rate for increasing values of lp . Moreover, with increasing 
levels of the organizational density of civil society, the dictator has to decrease the tax rate if he wants to 
prevent revolution. An increase in the quantity q has the same effect in this model as in the first model. 
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The extractive tax set by the dictator is monotonically decreasing with the probability of persecution.  
Numerical Example  
Figure 3 depicts the equilibria for the citizens in the [ , ]α σ -space, where the organizational density is a 






















                                                          
5 0.66α <  is considered a low value for the organizational density. Values for the network density can be found in 
Kim & Bearman (1997: 88). 
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 Figure 3: equilibria in the [α, σ] space 
Markovian Equilibria 
We introduce the following Bellman payoffs in the civil society persecution game for the dictator and 
the citizens: 
( )
( 0, ) ( , )
( 0, , ) ( , , )
( 1, ) 0
1 1( 1, ) ( )
1 1
c l c l
d l l d l l
c l
d l l
V S V N
V S p V N p
V S p







 = = − + + − − − 
  




1 1 1( , ) (1 ) (1 )0 ( , )
(1 )(1 ) (1 )(1 )
1 1 1 (1 ) (1 )(1 )
(1 )(1 ) (1 )(1 ) (1 ) 1 (1 ) 1
.
c l l l c l
l l
l l
l l l l
V N p V R p
p pp
p p
τ τ σ σ
α β α β α
σ β σ βτ σ α α
α β α β α σ τ σ β σ τ σ β
α α
 
= − < − + − = ⇒ − − − − 
  − −




α  describes the combination of external pressures for this dynamic version of the game, ***α  
has this definition in the static part of the game. We take **α  as the actual value of organizational 
density, as was the case in the first dynamic game, and compare the external pressure to the actual 
value. 
Proposition 4 
In the civil society persecution game there exists a Markov-perfect equilibrium, such that: 
1. If the dictator decides not to persecute citizens after a failed revolution { }( 0 )d Sσ = = , proposition 2 
applies, i.e. there will be a revolution. 













, such that 
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, such that 
~
**α α< ,  the strategy of the citizens is R, i.e. { }c Rσ =  
Comparative statics 
                                                          
6 The revolution constraint in the case of no persecution is not shown since it will be identical to the one 
developed in the civil society protest dynamic game. 
17 
We take the derivatives of lτ  with respect to σ , lp , α  and β : 
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The results reflect those of the static game to the extent that an increase in σ  or α  implies that the 
dictator has to reduce the tax rate in order to stay in office. An increase in lp  or β  has the opposite 
effect: the dictator increases the tax rate if the price of oil increases. This is because this increases the 
cost of revolution for the citizens whereas the first-mentioned effect decreases those costs. Since σ  has 
not changed, the conclusions in the comparative statics part of the static game apply to σ  from 
proposition 4. In contrast to the static persecution game, we see that 
~
***α α> , with the result that the 
bound to be exceeded for revolution for the actual organizational density of civil society ( *α  ) becomes 
higher, i.e. more difficult to reach and the dictator is more likely to stay in power. 
 
III. Historical & Contemporary Illustrations: Iran, Soviet Union/Russia & Egypt  
 
Iran, the Soviet Union/Russia and Egypt were non-democracies before their respective major 
revolutions in 1978-79, 1989-91 and 2011 and their economies are heavily dependent on natural resource 
revenues. Considering the Polity IV data, which systemizes countries according to their state of political 
regime with a ranking from -10 (autocracy) to +10 (full democracy), Iran scored the lowest value of   -10 
during the Pahlavi era and then scored -6 directly after the revolution (Polity IV Project 2014b). It is also 
the second largest producer of oil in the world, maintaining 10% of proven reserves, while oil 
accounted for an average of 20% of Iran’s GDP between 1970 and 2006 (Farzanegan and Markwardt, 
2009: 134). Furthermore, about 90% of total export earnings and 60% of annual government revenues 
are generated by oil export revenues (ibid.).  
Wintrobe (1998: 7-11) classifies the Soviet Union as a totalitarian dictatorship in which 
repression of the population and control of the economy by bureaucrats were the main pillars of the 
state. In the Polity IV Index, the Soviet Union scored -7 or less during most of its existence and received 
18 
a score of 0 in the late-1980s (Polity IV Project 2014c) when regime change was already on its way. Since 
the collapse of the Soviet Union, Russia has scored between 3 and 6, only obtaining the rating of a 
democracy between 2001 and 2007, but having a score of 4 since 2008, which classifies the country as a 
semi-authoritarian regime (ibid.). As Ahrend (2005: 595) notes, Russia’s natural resource exports made 
up 55% of total exports in 2004. Moreover, the description resource abundant applies to the Soviet 
Union, with rents from extraction of oil reaching a maximum in 1981 when they accounted for over 40% 
of GDP (Gaddy and Ickes 2005: 562). 
Egypt is also treated as an autocracy, constantly scoring below zero on the Polity IV Index – 
namely ranging between -6 and -7 between 1954 and 2005 since the rule of Nasser (1954-1970) (Polity IV 
Project 2014a). Its score rose to -3 in 2005 (Polity IV Project 2014a) when there was a constitutional 
amendment which paved the way for multi-candidate elections for the office of president (Adly 2011: 
304), but it has been decreasing again since 2013 (Polity IV Project 2014a). While Egypt has been 
classified by Ross (2012: 59) as an oil-poor economy when compared to Iran, Springborg (2012: 295) 
ascertains that oil and gas exports accounted for up to a quarter of government revenues from 1986 to 
2006.  
Figure 4 shows the development of yearly average levels of oil production of the three countries 
and the oil price path from 1973 to 2014.7  
 
Figure 4: oil production in Iran, Russia and Egypt & price of oil from 1973-2014 
                                                          
7 Data is missing from the years 1974 and 1976-1979.  
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Source: U.S. Energy Information Administration (2016c), 133 & 166-167 and BP (2015), 15.8 
 
Iran 
The White Revolution of the Shah aroused a clergy-led opposition (including Ayatollah Khomeini) in 
Qum to preach in religious schools against the Shah and start demonstrations with students against 
failed land reform and the regime’s connection with the United States. Demonstrations spilled over to 
other universities and cities and lasted for a couple of days until they were violently crushed with 
hundreds of people losing their lives (Keddie 1981, 157-158). Therefore, authors such as Ashraf (1988, 
550) see these urban demonstrations in 1963 as a preface to the revolution in 1979.9 However, based on 
this, it is puzzling why this uprising was not successful and why there was no successful revolution 
before the one in 1979. Bearing in mind the previously developed model, one could argue that the 
increased military and security capabilities that were available due to the increased oil rents would 
have led to unbearable costs of revolution for the citizens. However, due to the even higher military 
expenditure in 1977, this would be counterintuitive.  
Nevertheless, the arrest and killing of regime critics and opponents reflects the tradeoffs of the 
civil society persecution game. Kamrava and O` Mora (1998: 903) state that traditionally there have been 
three civil society institutions in the Middle East: ulama (recognized religious scholars and authorities), 
tribes and tribal confederacies, and the bazaaris (traditional merchants). Smith (2003: 186) points out that 
formal structures may lead to the successful organization of movements in democratic systems but 
informal networks hold much more importance in non-democratic systems because they do not involve 
government repression. The bazaar is such an informal system of networks in pre-revolutionary (as 
well as in post-revolutionary) Iran (ibid.). Skocpol (1982: 271) identifies the bazaar as the center of urban 
life in Iran. Ashraf (1988: 538-539) notes that the bazaar together with the mosque was the place for the 
development of social networks outside family ties. During all the demonstrations, urban uprisings and 
the weakening of institutions in the Pahlavi dynasty the bazaar endured and withstood government 
threats (Smith 2003: 185; Ashraf 1988: 544). In addition to the existence of informal communication 
norms, the bazaar had its own credit and internal mediation system where the individual reputation of 
each bazaari was crucial (Smith 2003: 193). This is why the bazaar is a perfect specification for the 
                                                          
8 From 1980-2011 the data for the spot price of crude oil is taken from BP (2015, 15) (brand: Dubai; dollar/barrel). 
Due to a gap in the data of BP (2015) the values for the oil price from 1973, 1975 and 2011-2014 are estimated to be 
close to the refiner acquisition costs from U.S. Energy Information Administration (2016c: 133) since they 
resembled the BP (2015) data quite well for the rest of the time series. 
9 Speaking about a preface to revolution it is hard to maintain the MPE theory insofar as only the current state of 
the game is considered for equilibrium strategies.  
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modern sector of the economy, where higher organizational density means better business and more 
income.  
Skocpol (1982) and Ashraf (1988) underscore the linkages between the mosque and the bazaar in 
Iran. As Ashraf (1988: 541) points out, the bazaaris traditionally had strong connections with the non-
officially appointed ulama. The geographical structure of a traditional Islamic town stresses the 
connection between the bazaar and the mosque on the basis of pure proximity. Both institutions are 
organizations of communal character. Moreover, the ulama was dependent on the financial support of 
the bazaar (Ashraf 1988: 541-542). It was possible for wealthy bazaaris to close down their shops during 
the demonstrations and therefore show not only citizens but also the regime on which side they were 
standing (ibid: 558). The bazaaris, the ulama and student activists formed the “triangle of revolutionary 
coalition” (ibid: 554). According to Smith (2003: 186), the religious leaders of the revolution were able to 
use the communication networks of trust and cooperation in the bazaar for the purposes of religious 
revolution. 
Events after 1973-74 explain why the Iranian oil sector was a pitfall for the government despite 
the observed oil price increase (see figure 4). Both in 1975 – the year of the Qum protests – and in 1978 –
when the Islamic Revolution started – the economy of Iran was in recession (Kurzman 2003: 295). 
Abrahamian (1980: 25) proposes that there was spiraling inflation between 1975 and 1977, which the 
state was not able to control. Unfortunately, there are no reliable statistics for this matter due to 
concerns about political manipulation (Kurzman 2003: 296). Nevertheless, a comparison of different 
statistical sources with respect to real GDP per capita allow the conclusion that the economy went 
through recession after the oil boom years of 1973 and 1976. Falling from 11.6% in 1973 to 3.0% in 1974 
and then to -2.0% in 1975, the real GDP per capita increased again to 11.4% in 1976 but decreased to -
6.5% in 1977 (Penn World Tables 1994, also cited in Kurzman 2003: 296).10 In addition, figure 5 shows 
Iran’s GDP per capita compared to oil prices from 1977 to 2000, where the movement of the former 
variable seems to be linked to the latter.  
                                                          
10 Kurzman (2003: 296) cites in his work two more sources (the Central Bank of Iran and the International 
Monetary Fund). Both those sources are in the same direction as the Penn World Tables, even if the Central Bank 




             Figure 5: Iran's GDP per capita11 and oil price, 1977-2000 
Source: Farzanegan and Markwardt (2009: 135), with data from BP (2015, 15) and World Bank (2016). 
 
Soviet Union/Russia 
Without knowing what would happen in 1991, Gustafson (1989: 136) pointed out that an oil crisis 
would occur in the 1990s if the Soviet government did not modernize the oil sector. Easterly and Fischer 
(1995: 345-346) ascertain that the performance of the Soviet economy, conditional on investment and 
human capital, was at the bottom of world rankings for the period between 1960 and 1980, being even 
worse than the performance of poor and small states such as Jamaica, Suriname and Zambia. As a 
reason for this slowdown, they identify the diminishing returns to capital accumulation with a low 
substitutability of capital for labor. By testing for Granger causality with data from 1918 until 2003, 
Reynolds and Kolodziej (2008: 279) suggest that a decline in oil production led to a recession in the 
Soviet and Russian economies. As Gustafson (1989: 9) notes, even though the Soviet Union was one of 
the few industrial states that was independent in its energy supply, it was plagued by shortages which 
were accompanied with massive spending to maintain an inefficient system. The reserve pyramid of 
Russian oil from 1958 to 2000 indicates that the share of proven reserves in all the explored reserves 
heavily decreased from 69.5% in 1960 to 27.3% in 1986 (to only 26.5% in 2000); however, the number of 
oil fields increased during the same time from 408 to 2,349 (Dienes 2004: 328). This investigation is a 
strong argument for the inefficient management of resources rather than insufficient sources for oil 
production being the cause of this.  
                                                          
11 In current US dollar; Data for 1991 and 1992 is missing in the source. 
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Jakobson et al. (2001: 16) describe the time of development of the civil society from October 1917 
until the mid-1980s as marking an expansion in civil society organizations in all areas where there was a 
lack on the side of the state, such as trade unions or scientific organizations. In addition to art, cultural 
and scientific organizations, including the well-known Russian Geographical Society, there were local 
movements for peasants and the non-elite population, providing welfare to poorer members of society 
(Buxton and Konovalova 2013: 774-775). However, the state used these mass organizations for 
repression purposes and they became part of the government machine (Buxton and Konovalova 2013: 
775). Therefore, a civil society independent of the state was difficult to find in the formal socio-
economic system of the Soviet Union. From our model’s perspective, while the financial situation of the 
oil sector deteriorated, the organizational density of civil society was ambivalent. On the one hand, it 
was used by the Party as a control mechanism (see Havel & Wilson (1985-86)) and, on the other hand, it 
was strengthened through cooperation in the gray/black market and facilitated higher levels of 
education. The improvement in possibilities for communication and information can be interpreted as 
raising levels of α . Furthermore, Suny’s (1993: 154-155) argument that Gorbachev’s “[…] ‘revolution-
from-above’ [moved] to a massive, multinational series of revolutions from below” can also be 
interpreted as an uprising of civil society.  
After the collapse of the Soviet Union, civil society in Russia was necessary in order to survive 
the deteriorated living standards, as Russian real per capita income decreased by 42% between 1988 
and 1993 (Milanovic 1998: 34). Self-help groups, associations for disadvantaged people and charitable 
organizations were founded with the help of preferential policies (Jakobson et al. 2011: 17). In April 
2006, a law named “On Introducing Amendments into Certain Legislative Acts of the Russian 
Federation” (Non-governmental organization (NGO) law) was passed; besides higher administrative 
costs due to expanded registration facilities, the state gained more control over NGOs by demanding 
mandatory audits and having the possibility to send representatives to NGO meetings. After some 
amendments, the law has been called the foreign agent law since 2012 because NGOs receiving foreign 
financial help or donations have to provide a report every three months. The official argument behind 
the law is to preserve Russian sovereignty by restricting the influence of Western foreign funding 
(Crotty, Hall and Ljubownikow 2014: 1254). Crotty, Hall and Ljubownikow (2014: 1255) distinguish 
between controlled organizations that do not represent civil society, grassroots organizations that are 
locally based and only have voluntary staff and traditional organizations that have paid staff and are 
funded from abroad. The new law undermined the viability of traditional NGOs, while it facilitated the 
emergence of more government-controlled civic institutions.  
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Nevertheless, Russian civil society has been able to mobilize. After State Duma elections in 2011, 
there were nonviolent demonstrations against fraudulent intervention of the state (Aron 2013: 62). The 
citizens see protests as an expression of the rejection of the current political system (ibid.: 63). The 
demonstrations not only took place in Moscow and St. Petersburg, but also spilled over to more than 
100 cities and towns in late 2011 and early 2012 (ibid.: 66).12 The authorities reacted to these 
demonstrations with persecution, charging 27 of the opposition leaders, three of whom were placed 
under house arrest (Lanskoy and Suthers, 2013: 81; Enikolopov, Makarin and Petrova, 2016).13  
Domjan and Stone (2010: 39) identify Russia’s strategy in the energy sector as resource 
nationalism; the oil price has been falling since 2014 due to a slowdown in the growth of major 
industrial countries as well as emerging markets such as China. Furthermore, there is a steady 
depreciation of the Russian ruble against the US dollar and the Euro (Dreger, Kholodilin, Ulbricht and 
Fidrmuc, 2016: 2). Even if Dreger et al. (2016: 11) do not find that the economic sanctions of the United 
States and the European Union significantly change the trend of the ruble, it cannot be claimed that 
these sanctions do not have an influence on the macroeconomy. The main factor in the exchange rate of 
the ruble is identified by Dreger et al. (2016: 10-11) to be the oil price: in an impulse-response function, 
the oil price can explain 8% of the behavior of the ruble after five days and 12% after one month. While 
Dreger et al. (2016, 2) evaluate the currency losses and the decline of the oil price as being negative for 
the Russian economy, the recent rise in oil production may counterbalance these developments.   
 
Egypt 
Economic dependence on natural resources is not as obvious for Egypt as it is for Iran and Russia. 
Figure 6 depicts the development of oil production and consumption in Egypt between 1980 and 2013. 
                                                          
12 In his presidency from 2000-2008, Putin’s approval from the citizens was at least 60%, reaching as high as 87% at 
times (Treisman 2011: 590). Treisman (2011: 595) explains Putin’s popularity scores with the economic 
performance of the country during his reign. 
13 These protests of 2011 are just a mere example. Indeed, there were protests before and after Putin’s first 
reelection. For detailed information about those and other protests in Putin’s Russia please, for example, refer to 
Robertson (2009) who also reports about ersatz social movements that are coordinated by the regime. 
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 Figure 6: oil production and consumption in Egypt, 1980-2013 
Source: U.S. Energy Information Administration (2016b). 
The declining trend in oil production since 1996 becomes apparent, whereas there is a steady increase in 
consumption. Finally, oil consumption (689,000 barrels/day) exceeded oil production (683.000 
barrels/day) in 2006, making Egypt a net oil importer. According to this data, the production of oil 
decreased by 23% from 1996 to 2011 (year of revolution) whereas at the same time the consumption of 
this resource increase by 46%. This is in line with the observations of Adly (2011: 295), who states that 
while 9.5 million tons of oil were exported in 1993/94, this number decreased to 2.9 million in 1998/99 
and state revenues generated by oil trading fell from 11% of total revenues in 1990 to only 2% in 2000. 
This development and the low oil prices contributed to the decline in total exports by about 2.5% 
between 1990 and 1999 (Adly 2011: 295). At the same time, the natural gas sector has expanded since 
the late 1990s, as is depicted in figure 7. 
 
             Figure 7: dry natural gas production and consumption in Egypt, 1980-2013 
Source: U.S. Energy Information Administration (2016a). 
25 
Springborg (2012, 296) confirms that not only has the production of natural gas clearly increased since 
2000, but the consumption of gas has also increased by 10.8% annually in Egypt since 2000. 
Nevertheless, the increase in gas production could at least partly balance out the decrease in oil 
production in times of growing energy consumption. According to the data depicted in figure 7, gas 
production decreased by 2% from 2009 (the point of highest production) to 2011 (the year of 
revolution). At the same time, gas consumption increased by 14%. Calculating the growth rate of the 
production available for the export of gas, i.e. the growth rate of the difference between production and 
consumption, the trend in this natural resource becomes even more apparent. Whereas there were 647 
billion cubic feet of gas available for export in 2009, this number decreased to 371 billion cubic feet in 
2011, which results in a growth rate of -43%.  
Khallaf and Tür (2008, 128) write that two historical developments were responsible for shaping 
the character of the Egyptian civil society: the 1952 revolution and Sadat’s infitah14 policies during the 
1970s along with the Mubarak regime and its dual strategy of restrictive openness. Both events 
contributed to forming a civil society sector that was highly skewed towards service delivery (Khallaf 
and Tür 2008: 128). This focus seems to be necessary considering that 40% of the population is living on 
less than 2 dollars a day (Herd 2011: 2). Moreover, the Mubarak regime constantly cut the direct 
subsidies for food and other basic needs from about 12.2% in 1990 to about 5.2% in 2000 from total 
expenditures (Adly 2011: 303). 
This Mubarak repression system was enabled and expanded due to the circumstance that Egypt 
had constantly been under emergency law since 1981, which was justified by Mubarak to protect the 
citizens from terrorism (Reza 2007: 533 and 544).15 The law enabled the government to order 
surveillance and censorship, to confiscate any kind of property and to prohibit participation in 
movements or other kinds of assemblies.16  
However, civil society had already diminished before Mubarak’s regime. Although Langohr 
(2004: 182) states that the Egyptian voluntary associational sector is one of the oldest in the Arab world, 
the Nasser regime had passed a law that heavily increased its control over voluntary associations (law 
32 of 1964). The Mubarak government declined this support and introduced law 153 in 1998 that 
granted organizations that were not politically active more liberties and enhanced the possibilities of 
                                                          
14 “’Infitah’ is an Arabic word meaning ‘open door‘ and refers to Sadat’s policies of ‘opening the door‘to private 
investment in Egypt.“ (Khallaf and Tür 2008: 141) 
15 The emergency law expired in 2012, but was temporarily reimposed in 2013 (Bhuiyan 2015: 499). 
16 As Reza (2007, 545) points out, the state intended to suppress the Muslim Brotherhood in particular. However, 
Reza (2007, 545) also states that it is uncertain whether emergency law could counteract terrorism or whether 
terrorism was a consequence of the repression under the law. 
26 
these groups to fund themselves domestically. At the same time, it restricted oppositional organizations 
even more than before because the Ministry of Social Affairs was now able to dissolve these 
organizations. The ministry had also to give its permission before a civic organization could receive 
foreign financial support (Langohr 2004: 194). This is similar to the Russian foreign agent law. The 
organizations concerned expressed their discontent openly and achieved a redrafting of the law, which 
was then revoked before the law passed on May 25, 1999 (Langohr 2004: 196-197). Furthermore, 
numerous civic organizations were co-opted by the regime, such as the Egyptian Trade Union 
Federation, (Abdelrahman 2012: 616-617). Thus, workers were prevented from forming unions to 
strengthen their positions against their employers and the state. Nevertheless, tax collectors could 
establish the first independent trade union in 2009 (ibid.: 619).17  
Formal structures of legal opposition such as protecting the citizens against the regime were –as 
already seen in the analysis of Iran and Russia – repressed under emergency law and could only 
emerge in the declining period of Mubarak’s regime. Once more, the formation of informal structures 
became important. In 2004, before the presidential referendum for Mubarak’s fifth term in office in 
2005, two grassroots movements, Popular Campaign for Change (Freedom Now) and Egyptian 
Movement for Change using the slogan Kifaya (Enough!), became active in protests against the 
government. Kifaya became known for demanding the end of Mubarak’s regime. Two network groups 
organized and announced the mass protest on January 25 – the national Egyptian police day – on their 
Facebook pages and over 80,000 Facebook users supported the event by agreeing to participate 
(Omotola 2012: 716). Moussa (2015: 786) indicates that free access to information, as provided by the 
Internet, helps to develop democratic structures within civil society. Lynch (2011: 302) states that social 
media and other forms of new informational structures, such as satellite television, certainly contribute 
to citizen mobilization by lowering transaction costs, breaking informational barriers and allowing 
space for opinion expression.  
Two and a half years later, on June 30 2013, Egyptian citizens demonstrated again, this time 
against the Morsi regime. These demonstrations were organized by the National Salvation Front, an 
alliance of political parties and groups opposed to Morsi and the Muslim Brothers, as well as Tamarrod 
(rebellion), a grassroots movement to depose Morsi because he had failed to lead the Egyptian economy 
                                                          
17 The Muslim Brotherhood defines itself as a political organization that wants to influence parliamentary politics 
and Islamic business. Furthermore, the penetration of civil society and social institutions belongs to its strategy 
(Duval-Leroy 2007: 6). Moussa (2015: 789) suggests that the youth of the Muslim Brothers were engaged in the 
demonstrations of 2011. Even though the Muslim Brothers are the main political opposition in Egypt and were 
members of parliament under Mubarak, they were also repressed by the regime of Mubarak (Adly 2011: 305). 
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and society in a transition path from dictatorship to democracy. Thus, this second revolution was based 




The purpose of this paper is to show the effects of oil price shocks and the organizational density of 
civil society on the survival horizon of dictatorships. Civil society balances power between the dictator 
and citizens, whereas rents from natural resources strengthen the de facto power of the dictator and thus 
increase the cost of revolution for citizens. The organizational density of civil society and natural 
resource rents drive regime stability in resource-rich dictatorships. Evidence from Iran, Soviet 
Union/Russia and Egypt suggest that oil dependence and a dense civil society can lead to both 
revolution, in the case of a negative oil price shock, and persecution by the dictator, under the 
conditions of a positive oil price shock.  
The oil price indicates the quantity of rents that the dictator is able to extract from the natural 
resources sector. Similarly, the organizational density of civil society determines not only the sector in 
which the citizens generate their income but also the cost of revolution against the dictator. In the civil 
society protest game, we show that only a negative price shock can lead to a revolution initiated by the 
citizens. In any other case, the price of a revolution is too high and the state of the organizational 
density is not sufficient to balance out the extractive capacity of the dictator. In the civil society 
persecution game, the dictator can avert revolution, if there is a high probability that the revolution is 
going to fail.  
As evidence from Iran suggests, the communication and cooperation structures of the bazaar 
and the mosque were used to oppose the regime and organize revolution. In the case of the Soviet 
Union, we find that these structures in the gray/black market result from economic shortages. 
Contemporary Russian developments underscore the conservative-progressive divide in civil society.  
Moreover, the Arab Spring of 2011 and particularly Egypt reveal the significance of the Internet and 
social media websites in the organization of a revolution, thus opening a new dimension to the system 
of civil society. It turns out that the organizational density of civil society develops path-dependently 
(the bazaar in Iran), and particularly in times of uncertainty. Authoritarian stability has long-run 
institutional roots and is vulnerable to exogenous oil price shocks. Thus, our paper offers some 
optimistic predictions about democratization in resource-rich dictatorships with a significant tradition 
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Proof of Proposition 1 
In the main text, we derived, by solving the revolution constraint, the threshold value of the 







 in a non-shock situation that will not quite lead to revolution. Now, 
we can compare this threshold value to the different shock scenarios, indicating that the external 
circumstances have changed but the organizational density of civil society remains at its threshold 
value. Furthermore, by assumption we know that 1l hp p p< = < . Based on the assumption that if 
the revolution constraint is binding there will be a revolution, we can state that for every *α α<  there 
will be revolution since the revolution constraint is binding. Vice versa, for every *α α>  the 
revolution constraint is not binding and there will be no revolution. 
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Proof of Corollary 1 
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which always results in non-revolution. 
 
Proof of Proposition 2 
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 , changing the tax rate does not help the dictator but instead 
makes a revolution even more certain: (1 )( (1 )) (1 )( (1 ))l l l l h l l hp p p pβ τ β β τ β τ τ− + − < − + − ⇒ < , 
which is true by assumption. 
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Proof of Corollary 2 
This proof resembles the one from corollary 1. To prove corollary 2, one has to prove that  
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Proof of Proposition 3 
For the first part of proposition, we consider that ( ) ( 0)c cV N V S= = . This way,
 
it can be seen with 
minor rearrangements that proposition 3.1) resembles proposition 1.1). To see this, the revolution 
constraint is established, such that: 
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For the second part of proposition 3, we compared the result of the revolution constraint to the 
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which is false because the left-hand side is positive and the right-hand side is negative given 0 1lτ< <
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Proof of Corollary 3 
The derivative of 
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Proof of Proposition 4 
For the first part of proposition 4, please, check the proof of proposition 3. 
For the second part of proposition 4, the revolution constraint is set up such that there will be no 
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can be derived using the fact that the denominator is positive based on the 
assumption that 1lσ τ+ > , which is shown above.  
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Since (1 ) 0β− >  and 0 1lτ< < , then (1 ) 0l lτ τ− >  but 1 0lτ − <  so that the left-hand side is positive and 
the right-hand side is negative and thus definitely smaller than the left-hand side.  
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